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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Army is transforming into a network-centric modular force. Developed by the Army
Research Laboratory’s Survivability/Lethality Analysis Directorate, in conjunction with New
Mexico State University’s Physical Science Laboratory, the System of Systems Survivability
Simulation (S4) is a detailed, agent-based, Monte Carlo simulation designed to conduct sur-
vivability, lethality, and vulnerability assessments of military platforms connected via commu-
nications networks to other platforms on the battlefield. This thesis explores key parameters
that make up S4’s communications environment, using design of experiments and data farming
tools to determine if any or all are having unintended interactions. This thesis concludes that
the explored parameters generally perform as intended, decreasing or increasing communica-
tion performance as the environment becomes respectively more or less restrictive. However,
the level of influence of the parameters varies greatly, questioning either the level of realism
to how the parameters are modeled or their necessity to the simulation. In addition, the vari-
ation across input settings and replications demonstrates the value of being able to efficiently
explore multiple factors and take many replications. As a pilot study, these results and method-
ology pave the way for enhanced analytical capability with S4 and its continued verification,
validation, and accreditation.
v
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Executive Summary
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct quantitative analysis of the communications environ-
ment within the System of Systems Survivability Simulation (S4). Additionally, a methodology
is provided that dramatically enhances the information that can be obtained from S4. This re-
search also provides a first step toward verification, validation, and accreditation (VV&A) of
the model, which will then enable its use by the Department of Defense to conduct survivability,
lethality, and vulnerability analysis. This summary provides an explanation of the need for such
a model, the justification of the methodology, an overview of the analysis conducted, and the
conclusions and recommendations for the future exploration and development of S4.
The U.S. Army has been transforming into a modular force, with a focus on interconnecting
combat systems through a vast communications network designed to improve Command and
Control (C2), the distribution of information, and consequently, survivability (Davidson, Pogel,
& Smith, 2008). As a result, the success of one military system is dependent on the success
of the other systems it is connected to on the battlefield. This concept of a System of Sys-
tems (SoS) requires that each system be measured not by its solitary performance, but rather its
contribution to the larger system (Bernstein Jr., Flores, & Starks, 2006). A full-scale test and
evaluation of an SoS would come at great cost and effort, and with numerous limitations. A
simulation, however, would be more cost effective and allow for greater flexibility and multiple
experiments. The Army has a history of using models and simulation to conduct many different
types of analysis and there now exists an urgent need for a simulation that models the effects of
a network-centric force (Zacharias, MacMillan, & Hemel, 2008). S4 was developed to fill that
need. Created in cooperation between the Army Research Laboratory’s Survivability/Lethality
Analysis Directorate (ARL-SLAD) and New Mexico State University’s Physical Science Lab-
oratory (NMSU-PSL), S4 is a detailed, agent-based, Monte Carlo simulation designed to con-
duct survivability, lethality, and vulnerability assessments (SLVA) of military platforms within
an SoS.
With communications being the foundation of a network-centric force, this thesis focuses on
key parameters chosen by NMSU-PSL that make up a critical portion of the communications
environment. In addition to communications, S4 models terrain, maneuver, sensing, ballistic
engagements, perceptions, and decision making. Shown in Figure 1, these processes are lay-
ered with communications as the conduit between what actions/events an agent encounters in
xvii
the simulated world and its perceptions and decision-making ability. Communication is simi-
larly layered by the equipment modeled, such as radios and antennas, and the environment they
operate in, comprised of effects from both the physical environment and imposed procedures
and protocols. This thesis analyzes 11 parameters that make up this communications envi-
ronment; however, two of the parameters are flags that enable their partnered parameter to be
varied. The remaining nine parameters include: Antenna Gain, Link Refresh—Distance, Link
Refresh—Time, Max Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) retries, TCP retransmit interval,
Bits in Data Unit, Bits of Overhead, Available Bandwidth, and probability of communication
success (PCOM). These parameters affect either data communications or both data and voice
communications, and contain continuous, discrete, and categorical values. To evaluate them, a
scenario was developed that minimized all extraneous processes, such as ballistic engagements,











































Figure 1: At the right, the actions and processes modeled by S4 are pictured as concentric circles (After Bernstein
Jr. et al., 2006). At left is the interpretation for this thesis how the communications environment is similarly layered.
This thesis utilized the data farming process as described by Horne and Meyer (2004), incor-
porating a design of experiments (DOE) to efficiently explore an entire landscape of outcomes.
However, the process of developing a DOE faced three main challenges: (1) a limited comput-
ing budget; (2) the need to handle 11 continuous, discrete, and categorical values as well as
restrictive parameter rules; and (3) a random number generator that feeds multiple processes
within the simulation. NMSU-PSL chose to conduct the simulation runs in-house, which pre-
xviii
vented the use of cluster computing. As a result, the number of experiment runs—and therefore
design points—had to be low enough that they could be completed on one computer over a
reasonable amount of time. This was achieved by building a custom design using a newly de-
veloped Nearly Orthogonal Nearly Balanced Mixed Design (NONBMD) (see Vieira & Sanchez
[2010]).
The stochastic nature of S4 dictates the need for replication of each design point. The simula-
tion, however, uses only one random number stream for multiple probability processes without
a clear understanding of when or in what order each is drawn. Differences between the results
of the simulation, therefore, cannot be guaranteed to be only a result of changes to parameter
values and independent errors. Using a sample of 12 runs, the variance caused by changing
only the random seeds was calculated. From this value, it was determined that in order to create
a tight confidence interval around the results, each design point would need to be replicated 15
to 25 times. However, although the number of design points created by the NONBMD was low
enough to allow for replication, it was still too big to allow for more than five replications due
to the restrictive run budget. The final number of runs conducted was 2,160 (144 design points
∗ 5 replications ∗ 3 scenario variants).
Two responses were used to analyze the output from the experiment. The primary response
for the analysis is Total Communication failures. The number of failures were also extracted
by type of failure (of which there are four) and by agent (of which there are 21). The second
response—Operational Delay—is intended to show the operational consequences of a degraded
communications environment. S4 produces a large amount of output, such that not all of it
could be transferred from NMSU-PSL to the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). As a result,
Operational Delay was calculated indirectly and under the assumption that changes to the com-
munications environment do not affect agent mobility. Using the same 12 runs used to determine
the variance caused by changing the random seeds, average agent travel times were determined.
Those times were then used, along with extracted data, to calculate the changes in time between
the reporting of a critical event and the action that event is designed to trigger.
Analysis of the output included observations from response distributions, effects caused by
changes to the scenario, impacts on different agents, relationship between the two responses,
and meta-models (regression and partition trees) in order to determine parameter influence. The
results indicate that there is tremendous variability across design points. Thus, achieving robust
solutions requires that many factors be explored. The results from this analysis also showed
xix
that the level of influence varied greatly among the analyzed parameters. Although PCOM and
Max TCP Retries were consistently shown to be the top two influential parameters, the order
of influence of the others changed based on the response and meta-model. Some parameters
were shown only to be influential as an interaction term and others only under certain ranges.
Regardless, the simulation performed as expected. When the parameter values created a poor
communications environment, both the number of failures and Operational Delay increased.
The inverse was also shown to be true: when the parameter values created a good environment,
both responses had improved values. Unfortunately, a design flaw—changing the parameter
values for all agents in the simulation—added to the variability, and created noise that limited
the use of the Operational Delay response to determine the sensitivity of S4’s modeled decision
making.
This thesis concludes that the parameters of most influence in this scenario are PCOM andMax
TCP Retries. Due to the varying level of influence of the other parameters, it is recommended
that they be checked for either their modeled accuracy with the real world or their necessity to
the simulation. Most importantly, however, based on the realization that the simulation is gen-
erally performing as expected, it is determined that the communications environment is indeed
playing a logical role in the outcome of the simulation, as well as being a conduit between the
communications equipment and the equipment users. Due to the large number of parameters
within S4, as well as the multiple processes modeled, it is recommended that further studies of
S4 incorporate the analysis, methodology, and lessons learned from this thesis.
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For the past several years, the U.S. Army has been transforming into a modular force in order
to better conduct asymmetric operations across the full spectrum of conflict. According to
the Army’s Transformation Roadmap, a foundation of this new force is the use of modern
combat systems interconnected to each other across a vast communications network designed
to increase survivability through better Command and Control (C2) and distribution of critical
information (Army Transformation Office, 2004). However, there are many challenges with
putting together a network-centric force:
• Effectively integrating technology with both new and old platforms.
• Defending the network itself against a less predictable and more innovative enemy.
• Harnessing technological advances that outpace the Army’s procurement process with
consideration of an enemy that has no bureaucratic procurement process and is capable
of rapidly fielding, and putting to deadly use, new equipment, technology, and means of
attack (Davidson, Pogel, & Smith, 2008; Bernstein Jr., Flores, & Starks, 2006).
To address these challenges, the Army is in need of an analytical tool that, without incurring
additional procurement time, can quantify and evaluate how one system performs within, or
adds value to, the greater system that is comprised of the interconnected systems across the
battlefield.
One model that seeks to do just that is the System of Systems Survivability Simulation (S4)
model. S4’s commissioned purpose is to conduct survivability, lethality, and vulnerability as-
sessments (SLVA) specific to System of Systems (SoS)-level effects related to threat, computer
network operations, electronic warfare, and ballistics events (Smith, Bernstein Jr., Hartley, &
Harikumar, 2010). Modeling communications networks, military decision making, and military
equipment using actual equipment performance data, S4 has shown great promise in accom-
plishing that purpose. However, to date, the model has not been taken through a verification,
validation, and accreditation (VV&A) process. VV&A is a modeling prerequisite that helps to
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ensure that flawed or biased models do not become mainstream tools. Without VV&A, it is un-
known as to whether or not a model’s produced results are accurate or correctly interpreted. This
study analyzes S4 using design of experiments (DOE) and data analysis to begin the process of
quantitatively measuring the limitations and constraints of the model.
1.1 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW
Traditionally, the Army evaluates new equipment by comparing the stand-alone capabilities of
the new system against the stand-alone capabilities of the existing system. A network-centric
force, however, demands much more than these simple measures (Starks & Flores, 2004). With
systems tethered to work together with other systems to enable combat power and information
superiority, the success of a solitary system is not independent, but rather dependent on the
success of every system on the battlefield with the network itself serving as a critical component
(Davidson et al., 2008; Starks & Flores, 2004). Each system, therefore, must be measured not
by its solitary performance, but how well it contributes to the larger system—or as an SoS
(Bernstein Jr. et al., 2006).
System of Systems (SoS): A collection of interlinked and mutually dependent sys-
tems that has properties and capabilities well beyond the simple union of the inde-
pendent attributes of its constituent systems. (Smith et al., 2010, p. 9)
To conduct a full-scale test and evaluation at the SoS level would require tremendous time,
effort, and cost. However, a simulation that could capture the dependent interactions of SoS
would not only reduce the effort required, but it would also provide the evaluators and decision
makers with the flexibility and insight of multiple runs using different scenarios, equipment,
organizational configurations, or environments. The Army has a long history of using models
and simulation to conduct analysis for planning forecasts, training rehearsals, as well as design
and evaluation for acquisition (Zacharias, MacMillan, & Hemel, 2008). Furthermore, there is
an “urgent need” for research regarding network-centric operations (Committee on Modeling
& Simulation for Defense Transformation, 2006). However, the challenge of producing such
a simulation that “specifically account[s] for information technologies; support of battle com-
mand, along with the traditional engagement-based warfighting functions, such as move and
maneuver and fires” (Davidson et al., 2008, p. 155) is just now being explored.
S4 was created in cooperation between the Army Research Laboratory’s Survivability/Lethality
Analysis Directorate (ARL-SLAD) and New Mexico State University’s Physical Science Lab-
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oratory (NMSU-PSL). ARL-SLAD conducts, among other things, modeling and simulations of
military systems and provides analysis of those experiments to senior leaders and developers.
They conduct this mission in order to ensure that military personnel and equipment survive and
function effectively in hostile environments. NMSU-PSL has a long history of aiding military
test and evaluation, dating back to 1946. Since 2004, the NMSU-PSL/ARL-SLAD team, com-
prised of experts in, among other areas, computer modeling, communication operations, and
ballistics effects, has worked diligently to produce a model that analyzes the survivability per-
formance of military platforms and equipment, both small and large, in conjunction with other
platforms and equipment on the battlefield.
As S4 continues to develop and improve as an SoS SLVA tool, one of the steps it must complete
to be used by the Department of Defense is a VV&A process (Department of Defense, 2009).
To verify the model, the developers must show that the produced output accurately reflects its
desired purpose. Currently, there is no clear understanding as to to how some of the parameters
in the model interact with each other or their value to the model. Since the communications
network is the backbone to network-centric warfare, the best place to begin verification is with
S4’s modeled communications environment.
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The intent of this thesis is not to conduct a complete VV&A process, but rather to conduct
a quantitative analysis of the S4 model. To that end, this thesis is guided by the following
questions:
1. Which communications factors have the most influence on the model’s output?
2. How sensitive are the model’s decision-making processes to the success or failure of
communications?
3. Is the model’s output a result of the equipment capabilities being analyzed or a product
of how the communications environment is modeled in S4?
1.3 BENEFITS OF THESIS
This thesis provides a way ahead for the continued development and VV&A of S4. Regardless
of whether or not adverse interactions are identified, the provided methodology can be used
to examine additional parameters within the simulation. Furthermore, this process highlights
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model inadequacies not previously identified or explored by PSL. The results and conclusions
of this thesis can be used to explore and implement changes to the model, thus strengthening
the use of S4.
1.4 METHODOLOGY
This thesis analyzes 11 communications parameters that have been selected by analysts at
NMSU-PSL and make up a significant part of the communications environment within S4.
This is accomplished through an iterative process that includes a DOE utilizing nearly-balanced,
nearly-orthogonal parameter selection that stresses the thresholds of those parameters, explo-
ration of the model, and finally, analysis of the output, in order to examine the parameter interac-
tions within the model and determine if any or all are providing unintended results or behaviors.
This is accomplished using one simple scenario with three variants, each of which place heavy




In order to provide SLVA, at its core, a model must answer the question: “what is the effect of
the performance of a given piece of equipment on the ability of a combat unit to accomplish its
objective?” (Hartley, 2010, p. 5). Information needed to answer this question includes:
1. Specifications of all the equipment and platforms in use.
2. Interactions between types of equipment.
3. Interactions between equipment and the surrounding environment.
4. Decisions, and distribution of those decision, that are made to employ the equipment.
S4 provides all of this information and more. It is a complex model, with numerous inputs
generating detailed outputs that is undergoing continuous technological advances and improved
methodologies. The following paragraphs attempt to condense the growing literature on S4 into
generalized concepts detailed enough for the purpose of understanding this thesis.
2.1 DESIGN AND METHODOLOGIES
S4 is a collection of integrated software components that models, in increasing levels of fi-
delity, sensing, terrain, movement, decision making, ballistic engagements, and communica-
tions through the use of an agent-based, partly Monte Carlo simulation (see Figure 2.1). The
agents within S4 represent dismounts, platforms, key leaders, or leaders on platforms, and their
actions follow a “sense, decide, and action loop” (Bernstein Jr. et al., 2006, p. 7). In each time
step, an agent senses what it knows and perceives about the current situation, either from what
it learned itself or through communication with other agents. Based on that information, the
agent evaluates the situation and decides what actions are to be taken, if any at all. Lastly, the
agent attempts to carry out the actions it decided on. This process continues for each agent until
the simulation is terminated as a result of a given stopping condition. The time and location of
each sense, decision, and action is recorded allowing for both playback and detailed analysis of
each agent or process (Bernstein Jr. et al., 2006).
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Figure 2.1: Graphical depiction of the inputs, outputs, processes, and tools used by S4 (From Smith et al., 2010).
2.1.1 Environment and Equipment
To conduct their analysis, ARL-SLAD uses equipment data pertaining to manufacturer specifi-
cations and performance results from live field tests. With that same data, NMSU-PSL utilizes
simulation technologies to model equipment within S4 to a high degree of precision. Depending
on the type, equipment in S4 contains information regarding physical dimensions, speeds and
rates, ranges, weapon capabilities, armor performance, ballistic impacts, damage assessments,
and much more (Bernstein Jr. et al., 2006). The environment within S4 is three-dimensional ter-
rain. Platforms traverse this environment using the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Reference Mobility Model incorporated into S4 to address vehicle dynamics and obstacles
(Smith et al., 2010; Vong et al., 1999). As a result, the model provides plenty of context for
agents to make informed decisions and the results of the simulation to be relevant to reality
(Bernstein Jr. et al., 2006, p. 6).
2.1.2 Decision Making
The decision-making process (DMP) within S4 is explicit. Based on its position in the command
hierarchy, an agent is assigned a specific DMP role. Each DMP is given specific rules to follow,
such as objectives to meet, criteria on how to evaluate known and perceived information, how
to prioritize targets, and contingency plans to take if a given objective is threatened or cannot
be completed. There are currently 17 different DMPs modeled within S4 that dictate different
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aspects of the simulation, whether that be movement and maneuver, C2, intelligence, or fires.
Since the tasks and purposes of each DMP differ greatly, S4 uses multiple techniques to model
them (Hartley, 2010).
The complexity and number of decisions made by a DMP has an approximately inverse re-
lationship to that agent’s placement within the command hierarchy. On the top of the hierar-
chy, Battalion and Company DMPs make generalized decisions utilizing a “library of situation-
response” templates (Davidson et al., 2008, p. 157). Based on their knowledge and perceptions
of locations and activities of friendly and enemy forces, these command DMPs evaluate Courses
of Action (COA) templates and select the best fit. The chosen COA is then issued to the subor-
dinate agents through a Mission Information Packet (MIP). Although the situation is constantly
changing, it rarely changes enough to force the command DMP to devalue its current best-fit
COA for another. On the low end of the hierarchy is the Platform DMP, which is required to
make constant decisions regarding its movement, threat assessment, weapon selection, etc. The
most advanced DMP in S4 is considered to be the Platoon Leader DMP, which among other
things, projects future states to select tasks, translates received mission orders into assignments
for the members of the platoon, and issues both speed and target information (Davidson &
Pogel, 2010).
A key takeaway from S4’s modeled DMPs is that they are at the core of the simulation’s sense,
decide, and action loop. No movement occurs in the simulation until a decision has been made.
Even at the start of a simulation, agents must first report their locations and statuses up their
respective chains of command until the applicable DMP is reached, which then evaluates that
information and issues the first mission order. However, since those reports are sent via com-
munication networks, the DMPs within S4 are dependent on the success or failure of commu-
nications.
2.1.3 Output and Analytic Tools
S4 generates enormous amounts of output pertaining to current agent states, communications,
decisions, perceptions, ballistic events, electronic warfare, and much more. Produced primarily
in extensible markup language (XML) or comma-separated value (CSV) formats, these output
files are typically separated by agent or process. There also exists a “Playback” file that contains
all movement, sensing, and engagement information by each agent, frame-by-frame. This level
of detail enables NMSU-PSL analysts to answer just about every possible question related to
SLVA. Simple metrics can be analyzed, such as network performance, graphically charting an
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agent’s perception against the “ground truth” of the simulation’s reality, or even the time of
events that drove key decisions to be be made. More detailed visual analysis can be made
using NMSU-PSL’s QuickLook “data contextualizer.” This enables the analyst to reconstruct
the simulation at each time-step and cartographically depict specific events such as ballistic
engagements (see Figure 2.2). Although QuickLook provides a terrific picture of these events,
it only shows the results from a single run, rather than a statistic and confidence interval from
multiple runs. Since S4 uses a Monte Carlo process, one run is but one realization of a random
process.
Figure 2.2: Image from a QuickLook screen showing agent activities by time-step (From Smith et al., 2010).
2.1.4 Random Number Generation
Many of the inputs to S4 are probabilities that an event will occur. These probabilities include
detection, ballistic impacts, and communication success. Instead of using these probabilities
in a deterministic sense, S4 implements a stochastic process (i.e., random number draws) that
introduces randomness to these interactions between agents, the simulation environment, as
well as within the DMP (Hartley, 2010). When an action arises within the simulation that has a
probability associated with it, a random number is generated and used to determine the success
or failure of that action. To accomplish this, S4 uses one initial random seed to generate one
stream of random numbers for the entire simulation. Each event probability then draws from
that single stream when adjudication is required.
8
2.2 FOCUS OF THESIS
This thesis begins the exploration of S4 by starting with the main ingredient to network-centric
warfare: the network, or more simply, the communication between units on the battlefield. This
study argues that the communications within S4 can be split into two categories: equipment
capabilities and environment. In the equipment capabilities category, S4 models voice and data
communications as either generic equipment effects or equipment specific to the Army’s inven-
tory, such as Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio Systems (SINCGARS), Force XXI
Battle Command Brigade and Below systems (FBCB2), and Mast Antennas. In the environ-
ment category, S4 models both the physical environment, such as propagation of radio waves,
and the procedural or protocol environment, such as the number of times an agent attempts to
resend a failed message. Figure 2.3 attempts to display this concept graphically. Since it is the
environment that restricts or enhances the operation of the equipment, equipment performance
depends on the environment it operates in. Equipment can be modeled by manufacturer spec-
ifications and results from performance tests. Environmental effects, however, can be a little
more difficult to get right. For this reason, this thesis focuses on key environment parameters











































Figure 2.3: At the right, the actions and processes modeled by S4 are pictured as concentric circles (After Bernstein
Jr. et al., 2006). At left is the interpretation for this thesis of how the communications environment is similarly layered.
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Listed in Table 2.1, the parameters of interest for this thesis do not make up all of the environ-
mental parameters. However, they were chosen specifically by NMSU-PSL due to their great
significance to the simulation. This set of parameters contain both physical and procedural
effects on both data and voice communications networks.
Table 2.1: Parameter Descriptions
PARAMETER(S) DEFINITION NETWORK
Antenna Gain A unitless number that relates the intensity of
an antenna in a given direction to the inten-
sity that would be produced by a hypothetical
ideal antenna that radiates equally in all di-




Measured in meters, refresh rate for network
adaptations in terms of distance.
DATA
Link Refresh - Time Measured in seconds, refresh rate for network






Measured in seconds, wait time before trying





Maximum number of attempts to send a
failed message.
DATA and VOICE
Bits in Data Unit Allowable size of message packet; Max
Transmission Unit (MTU) is made up of the
packet size and the size of the overhead.
DATA and VOICE
Bits of Overhead Overhead in message packet. DATA and VOICE
Available Bandwidth A rate of data transfer, throughput or bit rate,
measured in bits per second (bps).
DATA
Propagation Mode
+ Probability of Com-
munications Success
(PCOM)
Propagation is the behavior of radio waves
when they are transmitted from one point on
the Earth to another, or into various parts
of the atmosphere while being affected by
reflection, refraction, diffraction, absorption,
polarization, and scattering. However, in S4
PropagationMode is a flag between when this






In order to evaluate a simulation, it is necessary to choose a scenario or scenarios that both rep-
resents the purpose of the simulation’s intended use and emphasizes the parameters of interest
in the thesis. This chapter describes the terrain, units in play, communication networks, and
decision templates that make up the scenarios used for all experimentation.
3.1 SCENARIO CHOICE
The primary focus of this thesis is the interaction of communication environment parameters
within the model. With that in mind, NMSU-PSL conceived and implemented a simple sce-
nario containing a minimal number of agents and using well-traversed terrain from the National
Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. To stress the communications networks, agents are
required to almost continuously report their locations, in addition to observation reports and
issued orders. Furthermore, to reduce variability, the DMP processes are kept simple and all
ballistic engagements are removed in order to control the number of outcomes and ensure that
the number of communication failures cannot be attributed to agent losses. As a result, the out-
put of the simulation contains extensive data regarding communications with little confounding
from other processes or events.
3.2 SITUATION
3.2.1 Agents
Agents within the scenario are split into two sides: BLUE and RED. BLUE is the predomi-
nant force in the battle space and the most complex. Shown in Table 3.1, BLUE contains 16
agents comprised of three commanders, two different types of platforms (High Mobile Mul-
tipurpose Wheeled Vehicles [HMMWVs] and an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle [UAV]), and dis-
mounts. BLUE also contains five different DMPs: Battalion, Company, Recon, Platoon, and
Platform.
Shown in Table 3.2, RED is much smaller, comprised of only five agents containing one com-
mander and one type of platform (a generic truck). With fewer agents, RED also has fewer
DMPs: Company and Platform.
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Table 3.1: BLUE Force Agents
UNIT AGENT DESCRIPTION




CO CDR Company DMP; provides C2 to the Maneu-
ver Platoon; has its own HMMWV.
Reconnaissance Com-
pany Commander




HMMWV-4 Platoon DMP; relays information to and from
the Maneuver PLT; has its own HMMWV.
Maneuver PLT




Dismounts providing static overwatch in
search of enemy activity; Scouts 1/4 and 2/4
serve as their respective “team leaders,”











UAV Modeled as a “Shadow,” provides aerial over-
watch in search of enemy activity.




Insurgent LDR Company DMP; provides C2 to entire RED
force; has its own Truck.
Insurgent Team 1 Truck-1 Platform DMP; each agent has its ownTruck; Trucks 1 and 3 serve as their
respective “team leaders,” relaying
information to and from their teams.
Truck-2
Insurgent Team 2 Truck-3Truck-4
3.2.2 Communications Networks
The scenario contains nine communications networks that are shown in Figure 3.1. Since agents
can only communicate with other agents that are on the same network, each network is also a
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representation of the C2 structure for both forces. Each network is capable of handling both
data and voice transmissions; however, each type of transmission requires different equipment


















































































Figure 3.1: Graphical depiction of communications network in this thesis. The BLUE force network is depicted on
the left and the RED force network is depicted on the right.
3.2.3 Concept of the Operation
Essentially, there is one scenario with three variants, each with the same concept. BLUE is
operating on the eastern side of a mountain. Remaining with his Reconnaissance (Recon) CDR
at the Assembly Area (AA), the BN CDR orders his CO CDR and Maneuver PLT to move
toward a specified Objective (OBJ). To support their movement, BLUE also has its two Recon
Teams providing overwatch along the two passes that go through the mountain range, with
Recon Team 1 in the northern pass and Recon Team 2 in the southern pass. Additionally,
departing from the AA, the Recon CDR directs his UAV to fly directly to a point northwest of
the mountain range and then begin a counterclockwise overwatch of the entire range. To guide
the reconnaissance effort, BLUE has designated an Area of Interest (AOI), made up of the two
passes and the eastern side of range, in which BLUE does not want RED to enter.
Meanwhile, on the western side of the mountain, the RED Insurgent LDR orders himself and
his two teams to move toward their own OBJ on the eastern side of the mountain range through
the two passes. Moving through the northern pass is the Insurgent LDR and Insurgent Team 1
and moving through the southern pass is Insurgent Team 2.
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Shown in Figure 3.2, the three variants change in the location of the AA and the BLUE OBJ.
As a result, the direction the CO CDR, Maneuver PLT, and UAV move also change between
variants. Everything else remains the same. There is one variant with the AA in the east and the
OBJ in the north, one with the AA in the south and the OBJ in the north, and, lastly, one with
the AA in north and the OBJ in the south. For this thesis, each variant is named and referred to
based on the location of the AA: EAST, SOUTH, and NORTH.
3.3 SIMULATION EXECUTION
3.3.1 Reports and Messages
Within the scenario, there are four different types of communication. Listed in Table 3.3, the
types differ from each other in function, means of transmission, and occurrence. Due to the
high frequency of “spot” reports once BLUE forces locate and begin reporting on RED forces,
there are more voice transmissions within this scenario than data. It is important to remember
that only four of the selected parameters affect voice communications.
Table 3.3: Reports and Messages
NAME TYPE FREQ DESCRIPTION
Situational Awareness
(SA) Local Reports
Data Every 62 sec-
onds
Each agent reports what it knows




Data Every 106 sec-
onds
Each agent reports location, current
mission, movement, and equipment
status.
Spot Reports Voice Dependent Sent only when the sender is in visual
contact with the enemy. Spot reports
send information regarding what op-
posing agent they see, where it is lo-
cated, and what it is doing.
MIP Voice Dependent Sent only when the decision maker is-
sues a change of mission.
3.3.2 Decision Templates
Table 3.4 specifies the decision templates employed in this scenario. Part of the simplified
scenario was a reduced number of decisions to be made by each DMP. Again, the interest of
this thesis is the communication process that drives the simulation’s DMPs. Therefore, having
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Figure 3.2: Graphical depiction of the scenario variants. Clockwise from top: EAST, SOUTH, NORTH.
complicated decision templates provides no additive value when all that needs to be seen is
when rather than how a particular decision was made.
In general, BLUE’s template is simply to send the CO CDR and his Maneuver PLT from the
AA to the OBJ only in the absence of RED. As soon as RED is observed within BLUE’s AOI,
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the CO CDR and Maneuver PLT are ordered to return to the AA or to the nearest designated
rally point. Rally points are the AAs from the other scenario variants.
RED’s template is even simpler: Cross the mountain through two passes, in two teams, toward
a specified OBJ on the other side.
Table 3.4: Decision Templates
UNIT EVENT DECISION
BLUE
No enemy present (spotted) within
the AOI
CO CDR and Maneuver PLT move
from AA to OBJ.
Enemy present (spotted) in AOI CO CDR and Maneuver PLT change
course and return to AA or nearest
rally point.
Enemy within engagement range Do not engage enemy.
RED Immediate All RED forces move to OBJ; send
Team 1 through northern pass, Team
2 through southern pass.
3.4 SUMMARY
This scenario was selected by NMSU-PSL to emphasize analysis of communication parameters.
S4 is a large model with a vast set of parameters, ranging from the simple, such as terrain and
movement, to the more complex ballistic and armor effects. A scenario that incorporates all the
capabilities of S4 would be a great showcase for the simulation, but would seriously confound




The purpose of this thesis is to gain an understanding of the interactions and effects of our
chosen parameters within S4. To accomplish this, this thesis follows the iterative data farming
method described by Horne and Meyer (2004). Data farming allows for the exploration of an
entire landscape of outcomes without having to explore every possibility. Data farming—given
a model or scenario—is typically a four-step process:
1. Define parameters of interests.
2. Create a DOE to efficiently analyze the parameters at various values.
3. Conduct multiple runs of the simulation in accordance with the DOE.
4. Perform data mining on the results to obtain insight into relationships in the model.
Ideally, this process is iterated, with the finding from one set of experiments guiding the design
of a subsequent set of experiments. This chapter explains that iteration was not possible for
this study. Furthermore, having already defined the parameters, this chapter also describes the
ranges of and the rules for our parameters, the methodology used to create the DOE, and the
process in which the experimental runs were conducted.
4.1 PARAMETER RANGES AND RULES
For the purpose of this thesis, NMSU-PSL chose to analyze 10 communications parameters,
comprised of continuous, discrete, and categorical values, believed to be the most important to
the S4 communications environment. Not knowing the exact impact of changing these param-
eters, NMSU-PSL typically held them at constant values when using the model. In reality, the
values of these parameters might increase or decrease (perhaps only slightly) from those typical
values chosen by NMSU-PSL, so such an assumption cannot be guaranteed. Additionally, we
can gain more insight on each parameter’s impact by “stressing” it; that is, looking at ranges
that include not just the typical cases, but the extreme ones as well.
The process used for choosing these “extreme” ranges (see Table 4.1) was more discretionary
than scientific. For parameters where NMSU-PSL’s typical or base value was somewhat of a
17
median selection (TCP Wait Time, Max TCP Retries, and both Link Refresh parameters), the
chosen ranges of study were 1 for the low end and a value twice as large as the base for the
high end. For parameters where the base value was already at the high end (Antenna Gain, Bits
in Data Unit, Bits of Overhead, Available Bandwidth, and Propagation Mode + PCOM ), only
a low end was chosen. Although the low ends chosen for Bits in Data Unit, Bits of Overhead,
Available Bandwidth, and Propagation Mode + PCOM may not seem “extreme” in that they do
not go to 1 or 0, they are considered “extreme” within S4 in that they place great stress on the
modeled communications network. The low end for Antenna Gain also does not go to 1, but
for a different reason. In S4, Antenna Gain contains three different values for three different
groups of angles: 0◦ to 40◦, 41◦ to 80◦, and ≥ 81◦. In our use of the model, the range value for
Antenna Gain determines the input value for angles 0◦ to 40◦. For angles 41◦ to 80◦, 12 of the
range value is used, and the value of 1 is used for angles ≥ 81◦. Following this rule, using the
base value of 10 as the input value produces the three values of 10, 5, and 1 for 0◦ to 40◦, 41◦
to 80◦, and ≥ 81◦, respectively. Since it would not make sense to have a low angle range of 1,
1
2 , and 1, the low end was chosen to be 2, resulting in a low angle range of 2, 1, and 1.
Using these ranges, some initial trials were run that unearthed an unexpected relationship. In
order to vary Available Bandwidth, another parameter, Duration Mode (time needed to transmit
message), must be toggled between two values. This requirement both increased the number of
parameters of interest to 11 and changed Available Bandwidth from a continuous to a categor-
ical parameter, similar to Propagation Mode + PCOM. In addition to adding Duration Mode,
there exist additional rules that govern the use of those two and other parameters. Some of the
rules are pretty straightforward, but others are not. They are as follows:
1. To adjust Bandwidth, Duration Mode must be set to “2” (Bandwidth is “perfect” when
Duration Mode is set to “0,” meaning the message is instantaneously delivered).
2. To adjust PCOM, Propagation Mode must be set to “PCOM.”
3. If Propagation Mode is set to “PCOM,” then Duration Mode cannot be set to “0.”
4. If Propagation Mode is set to “PERFECT,” then PCOM cannot be set to any value other
than 1.0. (However, when Propagation Mode is set to “PERFECT” the probability of
success is 0.99).
5. The Bits in Data Unit value, plus the Bits of Overhead value, cannot exceed 4,608.
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Table 4.1: Parameter Types and Ranges
PARAMETER(S) TYPE BASE RANGE
Antenna Gain Continuous 10 2 : 10
Link Refresh - Distance (Meters) Continuous 20 1 : 40
Link Refresh - Time (Seconds) Continuous 20 1 : 40
TCP Retransmit Interval Continuous 1.0 0.1 : 3.0
Max TCP Retries Discrete 3 1 : 6
Bits in Data Unit Discrete 4,448 2,704 : 4,448
Bits of Overhead Discrete 160 160 : 624













The first four rules were handled by grouping the values for Duration Mode, Available Band-
width, Propagation Mode, and PCOM into one categorical parameter comprised of all 36 pos-
sible combinations allowed by the rules. For the last rule, a constraint was placed on the two
parameters, preventing their addition from exceeding the max allowed value. It should be noted
that Bits in Data Unit and Bits of Overhead normally have a dependent relationship in that the
addition of the two typically adds up to 4,608 in order to maximize the total number of bits
available for each message. However, enabling “under-usage” went toward the intent to stress
these two parameters.
4.2 DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT (DOE) SELECTION
To efficiently analyze S4 in the context of our parameters, an efficient design is needed. To
simply look at every possible combination between the parameters, this experiment would take
quite some time, to say the least. For example, to analyze nine parameters (ignoring the param-
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eter rules for the purpose of this exercise), using a DOE made up of the combinations produced
by a traditional two-level factorial design that looks at just the “high” and “low” values for
each, 29 or 512 design points would need to be run (Sanchez, 2008). Such an experiment would
provide great information at what is occurring at the corners of the model, but despite the large
number of design points, would provide little insight as to what is occurring in the middle of that
design space. In other words, there would be great insight into what is happening to the model
when Bits in Data Unit is at 2,704 and 4,448, but not when that parameter is at, say, 2,800,
3,202, or at any other value in between. Unless the response to each parameter and their inter-
actions are assumed to be linear or of some other functional form, something needs to be known
about what is happening throughout the design space. Following the factorial or combinatorial
approach to sample in the middle would dramatically add to the number of experiments. For
example, a five-level, full-factorial design would produce 59 or nearly 2 million design points
(Sanchez, 2008). What we want instead is a design that both fills the design space and requires
fewer experiments to run.
4.2.1 Nearly Orthogonal Latin Hypercubes (NOLH)
The development of NOLH by Cioppa and Lucas (2007) expanded on the earlier work of Or-
thogonal Latin Hypercubes (OLH) by Ye (1998) and provided experimenters with readily avail-
able efficient, space-filling, and nearly orthogonal designs for continuous parameters. These
designs are efficient in that they explore many factors in a modest number of experiments.
The fact that they are space-filling means that the designs sample throughout the feasible re-
gion. The nearly-orthogonal nature reduces the maximum absolute pairwise correlation (ρmap)
between the columns of the design matrix, which allows for analysis that is not plagued by
adverse effects, such as confounding, due to multicollinearity (Montgomery, Peck, & Vining,
2006). Moreover, these designs provide analytic flexibility by allowing experimenters to fit
a broad range of potential meta models and visually examine many relationships (Kleijnen,
Sanchez, Lucas, & Cioppa, 2005).
With only nine parameters for this thesis, an NOLH is available that requires only 33 design
points (see http://harvest.nps.edu). With this design, an apparently great space-filling design is
created. However, the max ρ between our parameters is 8.9%. A design is perfectly orthogonal
when ρmap = 0 and is considered nearly-orthogonal when ρmap < 5%. This high ρmap highlights
the main shortfall of the NOLH. While the design is great at handling continuous values, as it
was designed, it is limited when it comes to discrete and categorical values. In order to handle
discrete values, the NOLH software rounds its calculations, thus creating error and increasing
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ρmap. In order to handle categorical values, discrete numbers are substituted for each category.
This adds error from simply treating the values as discrete, but also because it forces a math-
ematical distinction between categories that more than likely does not exist. For instance, to
handle a category that contains the colors RED, BLUE, and GREEN, the NOLH would treat
them as a category that ranged from 1 : 3. Substituting 1 for RED, 2 for BLUE, and 3 for
GREEN, the NOLH would produce a design that rounded orthogonal values for 1, 2, and 3. But
do those numerical values necessarily map to our three colors? Is BLUE really one value and
GREEN two values away from RED?
Since the objective is to obtain a ρmap as close to 0 as possible, the NOLH design allows for
other operations to mitigate the correlation created by discrete and categorical induced errors.
This is done by increasing the number of design points by either “stacking and rotating” smaller
designs or applying a design intended for a greater number of parameters on a smaller set.
Applying the latter operation, a 256-design point NOLH, which is capable of handling up to 29
parameters, produces a reduced ρmap of 1.9%. However, this operation is done at the expense
of an additional 223 design points—a much greater computing cost.
4.2.2 Nearly Orthogonal Nearly Balanced Mixed Design (NONBMD)
This issue, created by discrete and categorical parameters, has been addressed through the work
of Vieira and Sanchez (2010). They developed an efficient NONBMD using a mixed-integer
program that, in addition to utilizing orthogonality and minimizing ρmap, takes into account
the imbalance of an experiment by addressing mixed factor types of varying ranges. Since this
approach varies based on the parameter and ranges under examination, there are currently no
catalogued designs that an experimenter can simply grab and use. Fortunately, Vieira was able
to create a custom NONBMD for this thesis that incorporates all of the parameters, ranges, and
rules. The result of his custom design is a 144-design point DOE that has both more space-
filling than the NOLH designs and a lesser ρmap of 1.4%. Although this is only slightly better
than our 256-design point NOLH, it is a design nearly half the size! Due to the size of the
Duration Mode + Available Bandwidth + Propagation Mode + PCOM categorical parameter
and the large range of Bits in Data Unit, the number of design points could not be reduced
further without increasing ρmap. (To see the comparisons between the design correlations and
design spaces, see Figures 4.1 and 4.2. To see the full NONBMD design matrix, see Figure 4.3.
































































































































































































































Figure 4.1: The NONBMD (top) has a lower max pairwise comparison (ρ) than both the 33-design point NOLH and

























Figure 4.2: NONBMD (third plot from left) provides tremendous design space coverage over the NOLH. Note the
corner lines in each of the design space blocks for the 33- and 256-design point NOLH designs depicting the
reduced number of samples near the corners. The plot at the far right shows the impact of the “Bit” restriction on
the Design Space. The shaded triangle is the area in which rule number 5 is violated and therefore, no sampling is
done in that area.
4.3 REPLICATION
Random numbers are used within S4 to handle the various probabilities that are modeled, e.g.,
determining the probability of communication success manifested in the parameter PCOM.
Consequently, runs with all of the same input parameter values, but with different initial random
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Figure 4.3: NONBMD provides tremendous design space coverage over the NOLH and easily incorporates all the
parameter rules. See Appendix A for corresponding matrices for both the 33- and 256-design point NOLH.
in order to provide multiple results that will enable statistical inferences to be made. In order to
determine how best to utilize replications, there must first be an understanding of how random
numbers are used within S4.
As previously mentioned, S4 takes one initial random seed to generate one stream of random
numbers from which multiple probability processes, such as communication, identification, and
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ballistic impacts, draw. To date, NMSU-PSL does not have a firm grasp on when and in what
order each random number is used (although this is something they are currently working on).
This creates a problem with design point replication: with multiple processes using the same
stream of random numbers and not knowing when those numbers are being drawn, if the same
initial random seed is used with different parameter values, the difference between the results
cannot be guaranteed to only be a function of the changes in the parameters and independent
random error. This is because that the runs cannot be guaranteed to be independent—especially
if critical events take place early in the simulation. If the processes used separate streams,
variance reduction techniques could be applied that would increase the statistical power and/or
reduce replication requirements (Law & Kelton, 2000). To incorporate separate streams would
require redesigning S4; therefore, to mitigate this issue, a different initial seed will be used for
every run.
Next, the number of replications must be determined. To find this number, the variance created
from only changing the initial seed within a single, representative design point must be calcu-
lated. To aid in this endeavor, NMSU-PSL conducted 10 “Seed Variance” runs using their base
parameter values (see Table 4.1) for each run while changing the initial random seed from 1 to
10. Using total number of communications failures as the response, a Q-Q plot of the results,
shown in Figure 4.4, produced an interesting picture. While the first eight runs appeared to
follow nicely along the normal line, the last two runs lay way above it. Not knowing if this
occurrence is a function of the simulation or merely a fluke, NMSU-PSL produced two more
runs using seeds 11 and 13. These two additional runs resulted in total failures similar to runs 9
and 10, thereby pulling the normal line up and through all 12 runs. When plotting the total fail-
ures from all 12 runs for just one agent—the UAV—the results fit even better along the normal
line. Although far from convincing, given our small sample and limited purpose for doing so, it
seems reasonable to suggest the response is approximately normally distributed.
In order to calculate the number of replications, the following “power” formula was used:
n =
2Zα/2σ
w , where n is the number of replications per design point and w is the width of the
confidence interval surrounding the results. As w decreases, the confidence of the results in-
creases. Using this calculation, our assumption of normality and the variance produced from
our 12 Seed Variance runs, using total communications failures as the response (σˆ2 = 11.9), the
plot shown in Figure 4.5 is produced.
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Without the power calculation, it is obvious that as n increases, w decreases. However, from
the plot of the calculation, the point of diminishing returns is shown to exist when n is between
15 and 25. Such information is beneficial, as each replication requires additional computing
resources. In the case of this thesis, this calculation is instead used to show what will be the re-
sulting confidence level. The NONBMD design that greatly improved space-filling and reduced
correlation from the 33-design point NOLH, did so at the expense of adding an additional 111
(total 144) design points. Therefore, without any replication, our experiment already consists
of 432 runs (144 design points ∗ 3 scenarios). Having chosen to make the runs themselves,
NMSU-PSL would be using only one computer—and not a cluster of computers—to run the
entire experiment. With each run taking just over two minutes to complete, adding too many
replications would create an excessive burden. After balancing the computing power and time
needed to conduct the runs with the need to have replication and increased parameter ranges to
stress the model, the number of replications was limited to five, for a final tally of 2,160 runs.
Therefore, the 95% confidence w for this thesis will be approximately 6.















All Comm Failures: Seeds 1-10
















All Comm Failures: Seeds 1-11,13


















UAV Comm Failures: Seeds 1-11,13
Figure 4.4: The initial Seed Variance runs produced two values of total communications failures that did not follow
the normal line (left plot). After inputting results from two additional runs (middle plot), the normal line was pulled
higher, but the results are not great. Taking samples from just one agent (right plot), however, does produce results
that seem to follow a normal line.
4.4 RUN EXECUTION
The processes of creating the simulation execution files and conducting the experiment runs
themselves were both simplified with the use of computer programs or scripts. S4 is designed
so that a Graphical User Interface (GUI) can be used to select and input each parameter value
within the model. Fortunately for this study, a programmer can also manipulate the parameters
within an XML “execution” file. To conduct this experiment, 432 execution files had to be
made with the parameter values for each communications device or agent changed in each file,
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Figure 4.5: Power Calculations using total communications failures as the response. As n increases, w decreases.
Future studies of S4 should try to incorporate more replications at each design point.
in accordance with the DOE. Accomplishing such a task manually would be quite tedious,
time consuming, and prone to error. An NPS Research Associate, Steve Upton, developed
the program XStudy that maps the parameter values of a DOE in an Excel spreadsheet to a
simulation’s execution file. Once all the locations of the parameters within the execution file
are identified, the process of creating an entire study’s execution files is reduced from weeks to
hours. (For more information on XStudy see http://harvest.nps.edu/.)
Since S4 was not built to conduct numerous runs simultaneously and access to cluster comput-
ing was unavailable for this thesis, so to execute the runs NMSU-PSL produced a simple script
that read into the simulation each execution file five times, incrementing the initial seed by one
from one run to the next. Under this approach, each design point was replicated five times
before the next design point was read in. A computer cluster of a few dozen processors could
have then completed the experiment runs overnight and with more replications. Limited to the
use of a sole computer after close of business and various times during the day, NMSU-PSL
conducted all 2,160 runs in over 80 hours completed over the course of seven days. Due to
the size of the output data (approximately 222 gigabytes [GBs]), transfer from NMSU-PSL to
NPS was unsuccessful using either the Internet or cloud storage disks. In order to complete the
transfer, the output was stripped of all files deemed unnecessary for this thesis as well as one file
that was just too large. The remaining files (approximately 19 GBs) were then compressed and
burned onto four data digital video discs (DVDs) and shipped via FedEx. This data compression
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process corrupted two of the run files: one from the EAST variant and one from the SOUTH;
both from different design points. Although these run files were subsequently transferred as
complete files, they arrived after the analysis had already been completed. As a result, instead
of 2,160 runs, 2,158 were analyzed for this thesis.
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This chapter explains the fourth step to the data farming process: the reasoning behind the se-
lection of the response variables, as well as the methods by which they were extracted from
the simulation’s output. Furthermore, it explains the process of how the output data was exam-
ined using data farming tools and statistical software in order to determine if any or all of the
parameters in question, and their interactions, are providing unintended results or behaviors.
5.1 RESPONSE SELECTION AND COLLECTION
It has been repeatedly mentioned that S4 produces a large amount of output data. Collecting
the data for each event—and in some cases, each time step—for various processes such as com-
munication, decision making, and movement for this scenario creates a roughly 92 megabyte
(MB) output file for one experimental run. Such voluminous output enables NMSU-PSL and
ARL-SLAD to examine the results of a single run from many different angles. For the number
of runs that this thesis is to analyze and in the time available, however, analysis must be limited
to only a few select results or responses. One response is obvious: the immediate impact of
the communications environment on communications success can be analyzed by the number
of communications failures. Additionally, failures can be analyzed by both type and affected
agent. In order to analyze the effect of those failures on the scenario’s mission execution, a
second response is needed. This second response must look at the time delay between when the
RED Insurgent Teams are first reported as being in the AOI and, as a result of that occurrence,
when the BLUE Maneuver PLT receives the MIP that changes its current mission. This second
response will be referred to as the “Operational Delay.”
5.1.1 Communications Failures
One of S4’s output folders is “CommsDMPAudit.” Within this folder is a file for each agent
in the simulation that records every successful or attempted communication received and sent
by that agent. When a message failure occurs, the word “REASON” appears, followed by the
failure codes below. The first two codes refer to both voice and data failures and the second two
refer only to voice failures:
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• SEND BY EXPIRED
• NO HEADER ACK
• NO DATA ACK
• NET CONTENTION
To extract this data, a script was written using Ruby coding language that opened up each agent
file within the CommsDMPAudit folder and counted each instance of each failure. Additionally,
to ensure that there were no other failure codes and that our search was done correctly, the word
“REASON” was also counted to serve as a count of total failures. The output resulting from this
code produced a file listing the number of failures by type and by agent. A quick check of the
data showed that the sum of the failures by type equaled the sum of the total failures, thereby
providing strong evidence that the search was correct.
5.1.2 Operational Delay
Within our scenarios, there is no flag set to identify when a RED agent is first spotted within
the AOI. The report sent up from this event looks just like any other; it simply contains the
perceived location of the RED agent. When the BN CDR receives this information, it compares
the reported location with what it knows to be BLUE’s AOI. Tracing down this communication
chain presents many challenges and requires the use of multiple files. Simplifying it to the time
when a RED agent enters into the AOI requires searching through the “Playback” file in order
to know the exact location of each agent at each time step. Unfortunately, this file alone is 20
MB and was not available for this thesis. Calculating our Operational Delay, therefore, requires
some creativity and a critical assumption.
If it is assumed that changes in communications do not affect the physical movement of the
RED agents, it can be inferred that once each RED Insurgent Team begins movement, each of
those teams will reach the AOI within the same amount of time. Of course, as explained in
Chapter 4, the change of random seeds will prevent this time from being exact. The creativity
will be in extracting not only when this movement begins, but also when the BLUE Maneuver
PLT receives the MIP to change its mission. Returning to the CommsDMPAudit folder (for the
sake of simplicity), after some trial and error, the following message key word sets are found
that specify the events of interest:
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• Insurgent Team begin movement: MOVE AND RETURN FIRE
• Maneuver Platoon change of mission: CO-A-HQ to HMMWV-R4. Blue-Retreat
The first set of key words for the Insurgent Teams are extracted from Trucks 2 and 4. Therefore,
the time step that this code is first received should be the time that both trucks in each team
are aware of the movement order. The second set of key words for the Maneuver PLT are
extracted from HMMWV-4, the PLT Leader. Receipt of this message means that the BN CDR
has already made its decision to change the mission and issued the order to the Maneuver
CO CDR. Since this message is extracted from HMMWV-4, the time step of its occurrence
is only that the order has been issued, not when the platoon actually changes direction. In an
attempt to ensure that these messages are only identified when they are successfully received,
they must be preceded by the key phrase “ReceivedCommuniquePart.” Unfortunately, if the
message contained additional parts, this phrase does NOT guarantee that the entire message
was received and acknowledged, only the part immediately following. To extract these time
steps, a script was again written using Ruby coding language that opens up the specific agent
files within the CommsDMPAudit folder, finds the occurrence of the key words, and returns the
time step that it occurred for each Insurgent Team and the Maneuver PLT.
Since the change of mission should occur after the first Insurgent Team is spotted, each team’s
arrival to the AOI is calculated using the time step when each initiated movement, plus their
corresponding average travel time. The smallest of those two calculations is then subtracted
from the time step when the Maneuver PLT received the MIP in order to calculate the Opera-
tional Delay. To determine each team’s average travel time and calculate an average Operational
Delay time, the data extraction code was used on the Seed Variance runs. Then, manually go-
ing through the “Playback” files that were available for each of the 12 runs, the time step was
recorded when an agent from each team passed a specifiedX Coordinate on or about the border
of the AOI, the corresponding time step was recorded. Subtracting those time steps from the
extracted “begin movement” time steps produced a mean travel time for Insurgent Team 1 of
21.15 minutes, with a 95% Confidence Interval of the mean of [20.58, 21.72], and 15.42 min-
utes, with a 95% Confidence Interval of the mean of [15.09, 15.75] for Insurgent Team 2. Using
the extracted change of mission times and the Operational Delay formula produced a mean Op-
erational Delay of 12.08 minutes, with a 95% Confidence Interval of the mean of [11.79, 12.37]
for the Seed Variance runs.
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5.2 MESSAGE “LISTENING”
As mentioned in Chapter 4, prior to building the DOE, some initial trials were conducted that
varied the parameters within our stated ranges. These trials revealed an additional insight into
the simulation that, although it had no impact on the DOE, is important to know when evaluat-
ing the results. Recall that Table 2.1 showed that five of the selected parameters affect only data
communications and consequently have no impact on voice transmissions. As noted previously,
the scenario in this thesis is heavier on voice communications since the majority of communica-
tions appear to be “spot” reports (an agent reporting the location and activity of enemy agents),
which are voice. In an attempt to remove this imbalance by making Spot reports data instead,
resulting runs revealed that data spot reports would go up the chain of command, but would
never come back down. For example, if Scout-1/3 reported to his team leader Scout-1/4 that
he spotted a RED agent, Scout-1/4 would relay that message up to the Recon CDR, but would
not distribute that information to the rest of his team. Scouts-1/1 and 1/2 would have no idea
that Scout-1/3 saw a RED agent. It turns out that on a voice network, the other agents on that
network “listen” in on all communications that occur on that network. For a radio network, this
seems like a realistic assumption for the simulation to make. However, on a digital device this
“listening” ability would be dependent on the type of device and, therefore, the same assump-
tion is not made for a data network. As a result of this realization, Spot reports remained as
voice transmissions.
As mentioned previously, S4 outputs a “Perception” file for each agent that, among other things,
tracks when an agent physically identifies another agent and when it is simply aware of another
agent through its communications network. Due to listening, these files could not be used
to help calculate the Operational Delay. When the Recon CDR sends his report of insurgent
locations to the BN CDR, the Maneuver CO CDR hears the message traffic and relays that in-
formation to its Maneuver PLT. Therefore, the Maneuver PLT typically is aware of the presence
of insurgents before the BN CDR issues the MIP.
5.3 COMMUNICATION FAILURES
Before analyzing the data, there are already some expected outcomes. From our knowledge of
S4 and the DOE it seems obvious that we would expect to see an increase in failures as the
communications environment becomes more restrictive. Additionally, based on results from
the Seed Variance runs, there should be different distributions of failures among failure types as
well as agents. Furthermore, based on the assumption used to develop our Operational Delay
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response, it might be expected that there is no significance in failures between scenario variants.
However, since the changing location of the BLUE Assembly Area creates different distances
between both the BN CDR and Recon CDR from the orbiting UAV and scout teams, a difference
in failures could exist.
5.3.1 Failure Distributions
All of these expectations can be verified or rejected with some simple analysis. Producing a
histogram of “Total Failures” regardless of type or agent (Figure 5.1) produces a skewed result
that is clearly not normal. The mean number of Total Failures is approximately 84.9, with a
95% Confidence Interval of the mean of [83.34, 86.46] and a median of 77. The minimum
number of failures in one design point is 4 and the maximum number of failures observed
in another is 250. The bulk of the failures occurred between 60 (1st Quartile) and 105 (3rd
Quartile). Breaking the failures down by type reveals that approximately 77% of the failures
observed were of type SEND BY EXPIRED, whereas only 17% were NO HEADER ACK,
5% NO DATA ACK, and 1% NET CONTENTION. These percentages makes some sense
since SEND BY EXPIRED and NO HEADER ACK capture both voice and data failures,
whereas the other two failures types only capture voice. However, the later three failure types
produced histograms that are extremely skewed left, looking almost exponential in distribution,
whereas SEND BY EXPIRED produces a distribution similar to Total Failures (Figure 5.2).
The skewness of these failures could be a result of the fact that the parameter ranges are not all
centered around their base values. Its possible that different ranges may produce results that are
more normal.
A quick look at boxplots that separate failures by scenario variant gives the impression that there
is not much difference between variants (Figure 5.3). However, a more detailed analysis, using
a One-Way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA), reveals that although there is, in fact, no significant
difference between variants for either NO HEADER ACK or NO DATA ACK, there is a
significant difference in both Total Failures and SEND BY EXPIRED failures, and a slight
difference in NET CONTENTION (Figure 5.4). Most notable is the fact that EAST has the
lowest mean and median failures. Measuring from the scout teams and the center of the UAV’s
orbit, the AA in the EAST variant is farther away (approximately 18.7 km, 17 km, and 17.7 km,
respectively) than both the NORTH (approximately 9.9 km, 13.6 km, and 11 km, respectively)
and SOUTH variants (approximately 15.2 km, 7.4 km, and 11.6 km, respectively). If our earlier
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assumption that distance between the scout teams and UAV from the AA is a potential cause
for any difference in failures between variants is true, then the EAST variant should have the



















Figure 5.1: Histogram of Total Failures regardless of type or agent with corresponding boxplot. The distribution is
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Figure 5.2: Histogram of Total Failures by failure type with corresponding boxplots. Clearly, SEND BY EXPIRED
is the predominant failure type and has a distribution similar to Total Failures seen in Figure 5.1.
The Seed Variance runs produced failure numbers that predominantly came from the UAV and
occasionally from various scouts. All other agents in those 13 runs had none. Figure 5.5 shows
that the UAV is again the primary source of communications failures in our experiment; how-
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ever, the HMMWV-4 PLT Leader claims the next highest number of failures instead of any of
the scouts. An interesting result is the difference in failures between the two scout teams. The
number of failures between Scout 1/4 (Team Leader) and Scout 1/1 are very close to the fail-
ures of Scout 2/4 (Team Leader) and Scout 2/1, respectively. However, the same cannot be said
between the other members of the scout teams. Also worth noting is that Insurgent Truck 2 had
zero failures in 2,159 runs. Other than these two interesting results, considering the scenario
and each agent’s DMP, the remaining numbers make sense. Agents with extremely low failures
are either primarily receivers of information, sending communications primarily to acknowl-
edge message receipt, or are issuers of occasional orders. Additionally, many of these agents’































Figure 5.3: Boxplots by scenario variant of Total Failures and failures by type. Although similar in appearance, there
is a significant difference between scenarios in Total Failures, SEND BY EXPIRED, and NET CONTENTION.
The difference between scout teams is suspected to be a result of the path traveled by Insurgent
Team 1. If the insurgents did not travel exactly through the path on which two scouts from Scout
Team 1 were on either side, the members of that scout team would not have as many observa-
tions of the insurgents to report. This would result in fewer sent messages and, consequently,
fewer failures. However, this hypothesis was somewhat disproven by NMSU-PSL. Looking
back at the “playback” output files, although there was a slight deviation from the path, NMSU-
PSL did not believe it to be significant enough to create a difference in reports. Unfortunately,
while it makes sense that Insurgent Truck 2 would have fewer failures than either Trucks 1 or 3
due to its position in the network, since its parameter values were varied in the same manner as
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Means for Oneway Anova
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Figure 5.4: ANOVA tables by scenario variant of Total Failures and failures by type, showing the levels of significance
between variants.
Looking at the effect of scenario variants on failures by agent results in similar findings to
failures by type. Again, there is a significant difference between variants among the agents that
produced higher numbers of failures (Figure 5.6). However, unlike by type, the EAST variant
does not always contain the lowest mean. For the CO CDR, the SOUTH variant contains the
lowest mean and for the Maneuver PLT Leader, although the EAST variant did contain the
lowest mean, the SOUTH variant was insignificantly different. The agents that pull the EAST
variant mean down the most are the the UAV and two scout teams. Again, this goes contrary to
the distance argument. Since there is no other clear difference between scenario variants, this


































































































































Figure 5.5: Bar chart of Total Failures by agent. This is evidence that an agent’s DMP and hierarchical position play






















































Std Error uses a pooled estimate of error variance














































Std Error uses a pooled estimate of error variance














































Std Error uses a pooled estimate of error variance
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Means for Oneway Anova
Figure 5.6: ANOVA tables by Scenario Variant of Total Failures by specific agents showing the levels of significance
between variants. The variant producing the lowest mean differs between agents.
37
5.3.2 Failure Influences
One method to identify a parameter’s influence is to fit a regression model with communica-
tion failures as the response. Using this methodology, two models were built: a simple linear
regression model with no interactions and a more complex regression model using all two-way
interactions and polynomial terms to degree two. Both models were fit using Total Failures
as the response to all of our parameters except Duration Mode and Propagation Mode, which
are both flag parameters for Bandwidth and PCOM, respectively. Additionally, since it was
shown to be significant, scenario variant was also included in the model. To eliminate irrelevant
parameters, the complex model was run through a forward stepwise Minimum Bayesian Infor-
mation Criterion (BIC) process (SAS Institute Inc., 2010). The results of these two models,
shown in Figure 5.7 produce very similar results. In both models, PCOM, Max TCP Retries,
and TCP Wait Time are the top three parameters contributing to failed communications, with
PCOM providing the most influence. Scenario variant is also shown to be a significant contrib-
utor. In the simple model, Link Refresh Seconds, Antenna Gain, Bits in Data Unit, and Bits of
Overhead are shown to be insignificant. In the complex model, Bits in Data Unit and Bits of
Overhead remain in the model only for their interactions with other parameters. Furthermore,
after the stepwise process, only 20 of the the possible 55 terms are included and Antenna Gain
is removed altogether. It is also interesting to note, that despite their dependent relationship,
the Bits in Data Unit and Bits of Overhead interaction term is also removed by the stepwise
process. However, since much of the response variation is unaccounted for in these models—as
evidence of their respective low R2’s of 0.44 and 0.55—the simulation does not appear to be
well explained by such regression techniques. That being said, they do help show levels of
influence.
It makes sense that PCOM is the most significant contributor to failures. A “coin” weighted
by the PCOM parameter value is essentially flipped to determine if the message will still be
successful after the effects of all of the other parameters are applied to a message. If PCOM is
too strong of a parameter, what would happen if PCOM is taken out of the equation? Subsetting
the data to contain only the 44 design points from each variant (660 runs) where Propagation
Mode + PCOM was “PERFECT + 1.0” helps depict this effect. In the upper left of Figure 5.8,
the significance of PCOM to Communication Failures is shown by the steepness of the smoother
line through the observations. In contrast, the rest of Figure 5.8 shows those same interaction
affects with the other parameters when PCOM is varied and when it is 1.0. With PCOM varied,
the steepest smoother lines belong to Max TCP Retries and TCP Wait Time. However, when
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PCOM is 1.0, most of the lines remain fairly flat, with only Bandwidth having a strong descent
between 0.9 and 1.0. From these graphs, there appears to be a change in influence based on the
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Figure 5.7: Simple linear and complex regression models with Total Failures as the response to all parameters
except Duration Mode and Propagation Mode. The sorted parameter estimates show the level of influence each
parameter had to the model. The complex model contains all two-way interactions and polynomial terms to degree
two remaining after a forward Minimum BIC stepwise process.
A partition tree does a great job of breaking up influence by ranges within each parameter.
Again, using Total Failures as the response and all parameters except Duration Mode and Prop-
agation Mode produces the partition tree shown in Figure 5.9. This tree shows that there is,
in fact, a difference in influence depending on the value of PCOM. When PCOM is varied in
the model,Max TCP Retries and TCP Wait Time produce the greatest effect on the number of
failures. However, when PCOM is set to 1.0, Bandwidth becomes influential when it is equal
to 1.0, confirming the graph in Figure 5.8. Bandwidth is then followed by Antenna Gain and
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Bits of Overhead. This tree includes 18 splits and produces an R2 of 0.6. The tree continues to
improve on that value, but begins to flatten out around 0.62, at which point every parameter is
included except for Link Refresh Meters.











































































































































































Figure 5.8: Failures by each parameter. The lighter shades and the upper smoother line show the failures with
PCOM varied in the model, whereas the darker blue shades and the lower smoother line show the failures with
PCOM equal to 1.0. The slope of the smoother line indicates influence between the parameter and the response.
Smoother lines were calculated using a locally weighted scatterplot smoothing (LOESS) smoother to degree 1.
5.4 OPERATIONAL DELAY
Intuitively, the Operational Delay response should have a fairly strong positive correlation with
failed communications. That is, as failures increase from a poor communications environment,
so should delays in message receipts. Because of this relationship, it seems logical that many
of the results seen in the Communications Failure response should be duplicated in Operational
Delay. However, an estimate of the correlation (ρˆ) when the Operational Delay could be cal-
culated is approximately 0.264. A quick look at the two responses plotted together further
suggests that this correlation is not strong. The plot, shown in Figure 5.10, confirms this is
a positive correlation with a smoother line through the data that indicates an increasing trend,
but the increase is very slight and surrounded by a lot of scatter and variability. In addition to
revealing instances where the change of mission was never received (represented by the ”x’s”
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at the top of the plot), the plot also shows multiple occasions where the calculated delay is neg-
ative, indicating a possible error with the Operational Delay formula. It may be the case that
the behavior of Operational Delay is more related to its calculated values made from a variety















































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.9: Partition tree of Total Failures as the response to all parameters except Duration Mode and Propagation
Mode. The tree shows that different parameters have influence on the model, depending on the value of PCOM. In
each box, ”count” refers to the number of instances and ”mean” refers to Total Failures for a given partition.
5.4.1 Change of Mission not Received
The experiment produced 82 instances in which the change of mission MIP was not received.
Possible explanations for these instances include: (1) the order was issued by the BN CDR, but
not received by the PLT Leader; (2) the BN CDR was not informed of RED’s presence in the
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AOI; or (3) the BN CDR received the information too late and decided to let the Maneuver PLT
continue to its initial OBJ due to its close proximity. Although the output and tools available for
this thesis prevent tracking down the actual explanation of each instance, there is enough data to
make some logical inferences. From the output, there were 11 and 10 instances when Insurgent
Teams 1 and 2 never initiated movement, respectively. However, since there were no instances
when both insurgent teams failed to start, the instances where the MIP was not received must
be a result of communications failures within the BLUE networks. A comparison of failures
of BLUE agents by whether or not the mission change was received (Figure 5.11) reveals a
dramatic difference. Each agent encountered more communication failures during the runs
in which the MIP was not received. An analysis of the means of Total Failures in an ANOVA
table (Figure 5.12) reveals that this difference is significant. If the communications environment
during these instances was, in fact, poor, then the parameter values for these 82 instances should
follow our earlier analysis of communications failures.




















Figure 5.10: Total Failures by Operational Delay. The “x’s” at the top refer to the 82 instances when Operational
Delay could not be calculated due to the MIP not received. For the remaining instances, the estimated correlation
between the two responses is 0.264. The smoother line is calculated using LOESS to degree 1.
The mean number of Total Failures for these instances is 139.65, with a 95% Confidence In-
terval of the mean of [130.02, 149.28]. Plotting our two most influential parameters together,
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PCOM and Max TCP Retries in Figure 5.13, reveals the makings of a poor communications
environment. PCOM was mostly at its lowest level of 0.5 and never exceeded 0.8. Similarly,
Max TCP Retries was predominately at 1.0, with one instance above 3 at 5 retries. The largest
combination of the two parameters is when PCOM is 0.5 andMax TCP Retries is 1. Looking at
boxplots of the values of the other parameters for these 82 instances appears to further confirm
their diminished importance. Although each tends to lean toward its more restrictive values
(except for Link Refresh-Meters and Bits in Data Unit), their values also span their respective

































Figure 5.11: Difference in communications failures when the MIP was and was not received. “No” and the darker








































Std Error uses a pooled estimate of error variance
Means for Oneway Anova
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Figure 5.12: ANOVA table comparing the difference between Total Failures when the MIP was and was not received.
The F statistic shows that the difference between the two means is significant.
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Figure 5.13: Parameter values when the change of mission was not received. Far left, an interaction plot between
PCOM and Max TCP Retries showing that the paired values when the MIP was not received reflect a “poor”
communications environment.
5.4.2 Negative Operational Delay
A histogram of the Operational Delays—leaving out the 82 instances when the Operational
Delay could not be calculated (shown in Figure 5.14)—confirms the presence of negative cal-
culated delay times. There exists the possibility that the assumption of consistent travel time
may not have been accurate and that RED moved faster in some scenarios than in others. An-
other possibility is that the BN CDR issued the MIP before RED entered the AOI, based on
reported locations, headings, and speeds of the the RED agents. Based on the modeled DMPs
and stochastic nature of the model, both instances are possible. Recall that while both the RED
start times and BLUE MIP receipt times were extracted from the data, the travel time was es-
timated based on the mean travel time in the 12 Seed Variance runs. Since the travel time for
each run was not extracted, a comparison between our estimate and the mean travel time for our
experiments cannot be made. However, it may be possible to interpret a comparison based on
the statistic results of the two RED Insurgent Team start times and the BLUE MIP receipt times
from the Seed Variance runs.
Under a “good” communications environment, the Seed Variance runs produced a mean delay
time of 1.83 minutes, with a 95% Confidence Interval of the mean of [1.55, 2.11]. The mean
delay time from our experiment with varying communications environment qualities is 2.97
minutes. Although this value is outside our estimated confidence interval, due to the different
environments produced by the DOE, it stands to reason that our estimated mean is slightly better

















Seed-Run Mean: 1.83, 95% CI [1.55, 2.11]
Experiment Mean: 2.97
Figure 5.14: Histogram of Operational Delay with corresponding boxplot. The dashed vertical line shows the loca-
tion of the mean produced by the Seed Variance runs and the blue dotted vertical line shows the location of the
experiment mean.
Comparing the start times for both RED teams as well as BLUE MIP receipt times between the
Seed Variance runs and the experiment runs produces similar results. The experiment means
are to the right and outside of the confidence intervals of the calculated means from the Seed
Variance runs. But again, this makes sense based on the changing communications environ-
ment. The difference in the distributions between the two start times and the MIP receipt times,
however, is interesting. Shown in Figure 5.15, there are no instances in which RED started
earlier than their modal value. In fact, each RED team began movement a mere 61 times ear-
lier than the lower confidence interval from the Seed Variance mean estimate. On the other
hand, the BLUEMIP was received earlier than the modal value on numerous occasions and 526
times sooner than the lower confidence interval of the Seed Variance mean estimate. Again, this
makes sense because these events occur at different times and under different circumstances in
the simulation. The RED teams are mostly operating in a similar situation each time: early in
the simulation, agents are close together, and there is little traffic to potentially clog the com-
munications networks. The BLUE change of mission occurs much later in the simulation, with
different distances between agents, and plenty of messages to potentially clog the networks.
However, the distribution of the change of mission time more closely resembles the overall Op-
erational Delay distribution. Understanding the environment that produced earlier changes to
the mission might explain the negative Operational Delays.
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Seed-Run Mean: 1.46 
95% CI [1.45, 1.47]
Experiment Mean: 2.22















Seed-Run Mean: 1.52 

















Seed-Run Mean: 19.69 
95% CI [19.22, 20.16]
Experiment Mean: 21.61
Figure 5.15: Histograms of RED Start Times and BLUE MIP Times. The dashed vertical lines show the location of
the means produced by the Seed Variance runs and the blue dotted vertical lines show the location of the experiment
means.
The expected cause should be the opposite of what we saw in the instances when the MIP was
never received. That is, the communications environment should be great. In fact, it should be
better than the environment in the Seed Variance runs, which produced a mean Total Failures
of 14.58, with a 95% Confidence Interval of the mean of [12.63, 16.53]. Figure 5.16 replicates
Figure 5.13 by using the 856 instances to the left of the Seed Variance mean MIP receipt time
of 19.69. From the interaction plot between PCOM and Max TCP Retries, although we see
instances where the values were worse than the Seed Variance “base” values (Table 4.1), the
majority of the runs occur when PCOM is equal to 1.0, and the majority of those occur when
Max TCP Retries meets or exceeds the base value of 3. Furthermore, the boxplot of TCP
Wait Time leans above its base value of 1.0, which was shown to improve the communications
environment when PCOM was less than 1.0. However, these instances produced a mean Total
Failures of 68.32, with a 95% Confidence Interval of the mean of [66.49, 70.15]. Although this
value is low in consideration of the overall distribution of Total Failures, it is much higher than
the mean from the Seed Variance runs. From this evidence, it appears as though the calculated
negative values are indeed a product of a very good communications environment, but there
also appears to be some error caused by the constructed formula.
5.4.3 Delay Influences
It was argued earlier that there should not only exist a positive correlation between Commu-
nications Failures and Operational Delay, but that as a result, their influences should be the
same. This hypothesis is easily disproved by duplicating the models produced for Communi-
cations Failures. Although PCOM remains the top influence, Max TCP Retries is now almost
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as influential. The remaining parameters and/or interaction terms all find different levels of in-
fluence. Even some parameters that were significant in predicting Communication Failures are
now insignificant when predicting Operational Delay. For example, Antenna Gain was left out
of the complex model for Communication Failures, but is not removed by the stepwise process
in the complex model for Operational Delay. Figure 5.17 shows a lot of straight smoother lines
through the output by each parameter. Only PCOM has any noticeable slope. A partition tree
of the data reveals a similar result. Shown in Figure 5.18, after one split by Max TCP Retries,
the remaining six splits all involve PCOM, suggesting a highly non-linear relationship between
PCOM and Operational Delay. However, in this tree—as in the two regression models—R2 is
extremely low. Although part of this low value can be attributed to the handling of instances
when Operational Delay could not be calculated, the great amount of variance is evident in
Figure 5.10 with or without those 82 instances.








































































































































Figure 5.16: Parameter values when the MIP was received earlier than the Seed Variance mean time. Far left,
an interaction plot between PCOM and Max TCP Retries showing that the paired values, when the MIP was not
received, reflect a “good” communications environment.
Consider the experimental design: the communication parameters were varied for all agents,
both BLUE and RED. Therefore, Operational Delay is calculated using two values affected by
the communications environment. When the communications environment results in BLUE
taking longer to receive the MIP change, that same environment no doubt resulted in RED
taking longer to initiate movement. The difference between the two times may still change as
a result of the changing environment, but since they are moving together in the same direction
the impact is less discernible. This realization, in addition to the variance and noise from the
travel time calculation, means that parameter influences in regard to Operational Delay cannot
be evaluated in too much detail. In hindsight, it would have been beneficial to only vary BLUE’s
parameters and keep RED’s constant. That being said, there is enough evidence to support the
influence of both PCOM and Max TCP Retries on Operational Delay.
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Figure 5.17: Operational Delay by each parameter. The slope of the smoother line indicates influence between the


















































































































































Figure 5.18: Partition tree with Operational Delay as the response to all parameters except Duration Mode and
Propagation Mode. In each box, ”count” refers to the number of instances and ”mean” refers to Total Failures for a
given partition. The tree shows that PCOM has the majority of influence on the response; however, the tree does




This thesis set out to explain key communications factors within S4 with quantitative analysis.
By using a focused scenario, the data farming process, incorporating a cutting edge DOE, and
various analytical models and tools, this thesis answered some critical questions regarding the
communication environment within the simulation and paved the way for future studies and a
more in-depth VV&A process. The conclusions reached, however, are limited to the scenario
examined over the parameter ranges explored.
6.1 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
In developing the purpose of this thesis, three primary questions were formulated to address the
concerns raised by NMSU-PSL regarding S4:
1. Which communications factors have the most influence on the model’s output?
2. How sensitive are the model’s DMPs to the success or failure of communications?
3. Is the model’s output a result of the equipment capabilities being analyzed or a product
of how the communications environment is modeled in S4?
The following sections discuss the results of our analysis in consideration of these questions.
6.1.1 Influence
Two responses and a variety of techniques, including regression models and partition trees, were
used to show how parameters influenced the model. For the most part, results varied between
techniques and responses. Some models threw out parameters and/or interaction terms that
others retained. However, each technique and response had one thing in common: they each
listed PCOM and Max TCP Retries as the most influential values in determining the response
value for this scenario. Additionally, looking at the one-way effects, those two parameters had
influence across their entire varied range, whereas the impact of others existed with less regard
to changes in their value. This does not necessarily imply that the other parameters are useless in
the model. These influence techniques left a lot of unexplained variance shown by their low R2
values. Additionally, partition trees provided evidence that different parameters have different
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levels of influence based on the overall communications environment. For instance, Bandwidth
plays a greater role when PCOM is not equal to 1.0. However, this conclusion points to two
possibilities worth exploring: (1) modeling of some parameters may not be consistent with real-
world effects or (2) some parameters may not be necessary—at least in the scenario modeled.
There were no adverse interactions identified; however, the wide disparity between influence
leads one to wonder if maybe some parameters are modeled too strongly and/or others too
weakly. Is the PCOM “coin flip” located in the proper place within the model? Does Link
Refresh have a direct, real-world impact on communications success or are its effects truly
minimal and only noticed in its interaction with other factors? The lesser influence could also
be a result of extreme ranges from this stress test. In other words, the effect of Bandwidth might
be higher if the experiment explored the parameter more closely between 0.9 and 1.0. On the
other hand, if the parameters correspond accurately to real-world effects, yet their impact is so
low that the resulting output is barely affected by it presence, it may not be worth the additional
computing power to include them in the simulation. A simpler model that produces the same
results and allows for the same analysis as a complex model can save tremendous time and
effort, and possibly provide the user with faster and/or more robust analysis.
6.1.2 Decision-Making Processes (DMP) Sensitivity
This thesis did not vary any of the decision templates. Instead, it attempted to determine how
sensitive the modeled DMPs are to failed communications by analyzing a quantifiable delay
caused by poor communications. If the simulation produced operational results without respect
to communications, then the entire simulation fails as a network-centric model. Unfortunately,
a flaw in the experiment design limited the analytic power of the created Operational Delay
response, thus preventing an actual calculation of sensitivity. However, through all of the noise
there exists significant evidence showing that the quality of the communications environment
did, in fact, play a role in the timing of the DMPs. In a “good” communications environment,
the change of mission order could be received up to 6 minutes earlier than the base case and
as late as 15 minutes in a “poor,” but still effective environment. When the environment was
completely ineffective, the key decision to redirect the Maneuver PLT was either not made or
not received as a result of a “bad” communications environment. Based on these results, it is
clear that decisions in S4 cannot be made without communications and that the quality of the
communications environment affects the outcome of the simulated operation.
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6.1.3 Equipment Versus Environment
The output from this thesis reflects only the effects of key communications environment pa-
rameters and did not extract any response to directly analyze the modeled equipment effects.
However, similar to the rationale in drawing a conclusion regarding the DMP, if the commu-
nications environment was ineffective in improving or degrading communications, it can be
argued that the modeled equipment is unrealistically operating without restriction. Of course,
the results showed a wide range of failures stemming from the changing communications en-
vironment. It is apparent that the communications environment is indeed playing a critical role
between equipment sending and receiving communications. However, since communications
equipment was not varied, this conclusion is limited only to the equipment modeled in this
experiment.
6.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
This thesis just began to scratch the S4 surface. The simulation contains thousands of param-
eters belonging to multiple processes. In addition to communications, the developers at PSL
would benefit greatly from detailed analysis regarding the sensing, terrain, movement, decision
making, and ballistics engagements within S4. Since this thesis used only a handful of param-
eters, further analysis regarding the communications environment is also needed. Furthermore,
an additional study is needed to explore these same parameters under a different set of less
stressful ranges that might better emphasize or explain interactions. The unexplained difference
between scenario variants also warrants further exploration to ensure the effect of distance is
accurately portrayed in the model. Most importantly, the methodologies outlined in this thesis
can be used as a guide for future research of either another selected group of parameters or all
of the parameters belonging to a particular process. Future studies, however, should take into
consideration the challenges this thesis faced regarding the calculation of Operational Delay,
random number generation, lack of cluster computing, and output handling.
6.2.1 Multiple Replications and Cluster Computing
Future studies must incorporate multiple replications of S4 due to the substantial variability
found across design points and within replications. Doing so, in conjunction with a DOE,
will ensure robust answers over a breadth of possibilities. In order to accomplish this, cluster
computing and a sophisticated DOE, should be used. The lack of access to a computer cluster
to conduct the runs for this thesis limited the total number of runs that could be conducted. A
cluster computer would have enabled either a larger and more space-filling DOE and/or more
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replications per design point, thereby improving the accuracy of the results. Additionally, it
would have enabled this thesis to follow the “iterative” process of data farming. Instead, the
amount of time needed to conduct the runs removed any possibility for reruns (possibly fixing
the “RED Constant” issue) or the opportunity to “zoom” in on some of the more interesting
interactions or ranges. Future studies that intend to analyze more parameters at once should
strongly consider using a computer cluster to ensure that enough design points and replications
are used.
6.2.2 Random Number Generation
The developers at PSL are working on understanding when and in what order each process
draws from the random number stream. Although this would help to explain the uncertainty of
the simulation’s stochastic processes, it might prove more beneficial to use a separate stream of
random numbers for each process within the simulation. Doing so would make future studies
such as this, as well as the VV&A process, much simpler. With a separate streams of numbers,
independence between runs can be guaranteed and variance reduction techniques can be applied
in future studies.
6.2.3 Leave RED Constant
The difficulty regarding the calculation and analysis of the Operational Delay response could
have been easily mitigated. Had the experimental design only varied the communications pa-
rameters for the BLUE force and left the RED force constant, there would have been far less
variability in RED’s communications and movements. This would simplify the formulation for
Operational Delay since RED would initiate movement and arrive in the AOI within a tighter
time interval. Additionally, the noise in the calculation would be diminished, since RED’s
changing movement would no longer have correlation to BLUE’s MIP receipt.
6.2.4 Output Handling
The fact that the runs for this thesis were conducted dislocated from the researcher limited
the amount of output available for analysis. Due to the size of the output, not all of the files
could be reasonably transported between PSL and the researcher. Furthermore, access to the
advanced postprocessing tools of PSL was also limited. Access to all of the output files and
PSL’s postprocessing tools would increase the accuracy and variety of response parameters and
improve the detail of future analysis.
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6.3 RESEARCH SUMMARY
This thesis sought to explore the interactions of selected communications parameters within S4.
It does not purport to possess or provide expertise regarding real-world communications effects.
The varying levels of influence found may be a legitimate representation of reality and the ef-
fects of some of the lesser influential parameters may provide a greater impact under a different
scenario or sets of ranges. What is most important is that S4 reacted in a logical manner—as the
communications environment degraded, so did the ability of agents to communicate with each
other—and that ability improved as the communications environment improved. Such a realiza-
tion of performance cannot be said of all simulations during development. S4 is clearly heading
in the right direction. Its continued exploration and development incorporating the analysis,
methodology, and lessons learned from this thesis should pave the path toward VV&A.
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The following matrices belong to the 33- and 256-design point NOLH designs that were considered—
but not used—for this thesis. The disparity between these two designs and the NONBMD that













































0 5 15 25 35
Antena Gain
0 2 4 6 8
Max TCPRetries
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
TCP RetransInterval
0 1 2 3
Link RefreshMeters
0 10 20 30
Link RefreshSeconds





Figure A.1: 33-design point NOLH provides less design space coverage, produces higher ρmap than the NONBMD,
and does not incorporate the bit restriction rule. Note the corner lines in each of the design space blocks depict the
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Figure A.2: 256-design point NOLH provides slightly less design space coverage, produces a slightly higher ρmap
than the NONBMD, and does not incorporate the bit restriction rule. Note the corner lines in each of the design
space blocks depict the reduced number of samples near the corners.
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